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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIElD (D ., MONTANA)

DEFENSE AND MR .
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-,!"~
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Ft<l DEC 1:3 1963

McNAMARA

Mr. President:
Fvr some time the Government Operations Committee has been
inquiring into the circumstances surrounding the award of a contract for
development of the T.F .X. plane .

What will emerge from this investigation,

what legislation will derive from it , cannot be foreseen .

It is not my

intention to anticipate, much less to prejudge the Committee's findings .
But whatever the outcome, let there be no doubt as to the interest of
the Senate in this matter .

It is an entirely appropriate and pertinent

interest .
Public funds are spent in vast sums for military research and
development.

Together with the President, it is the Congress which pro-

vides the legal basis for the procedures under which these funds are
expended.

It is the Congress which appropriates these funds.

It is the

Congress which must answer to the people as to the general wisdom of the
appropriations.

And in part at least, the Congress must answer for the

effectiveness with which these appropriations are disbursed by the Executive Branch.

The very process of COJIJDittee inquiry, moreover, has signi-

ficant value in an educative sense .

And in the end that which may be

learned in this or any particular case could well
Rpplication.

ha~

wider legislative

In inquiring deeply into the T.F. X. matter, therefore, the

Committee on Government Operations is discl1arging a wholly legitimate
function by authority of and on behalf of the Senate .
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I say that what has transpired to date in the investigation

has led me to take the floor today .

I do so to give voice to the views of

one Member of the Senate, a Senator from Montana .

The views are not new.

Rather , they are views which have accumulated over the years and have begun
to crystalize in the light of developments in the T.F.X. inquiry.
It is apparent from these hearings , that an immense number of
factors were involved in the T.F.X. contract award.
are of a military nature .
cations .

Some of these factors

Others are b roader than military in their impli-

And many are not open or shut tangibles but, rather , involve best

judgments on the part of the men who are expected by the nature of the
responsibilities entrusted to them to make best judgments.
Since such is the case, I do not believe that it is reasonable
to expect any Senator or Committee of Senators to say with certainty that
Secretary McNamara' s decision in the T .F .X. was the right one or the wrong
one .

Nor do I believe that the spokesman of any particular branch of the

Armed Services is competent to say with certainty that the Secretary's
decision was the right one or the wrong one.

Nor, in the light of the

factors involved, are all of the spokesmen of the military services combined
competent to do s o.

To be sure , their professionalism gives great weight

to such objective military opinions as they may advance .

But we should not

overlook the fact that their very professionalism compels them to regard
the development of a piece of military equipment, not in the context of
total costs and national policies but largely in terms of military desirability and specifi c utility and, perhaps , even more pointedly, in terms of
military desirability and specific utility as seen against a background of
a particular training and service experience.

That is as it should be .

Military leaders are not required and ought not to be required to answer

- 3 the questions of the people of this nation as to the additional tax burdens
or the neglected civilian needs which any military cost may entail .
these questions must be answered by someone in this government .
they must be answered by the President and by the Congress .

But

I ndeed,

And because

that is the case and must remain so under a system of free and responsible
government , it is not appropriate and it may be misleading to weigh military
observations on any weapons- system in a vacuum and to assume that decisions
arrived at on that basis are automatically the val i d decisions.
Even Mr . McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, with all due respect,
cannot speak with certainty as to the correctness of his decisions in the
T. F.X. matter .

Only time , if even that, will permit a logical assessment

of his specific judgments .
The truth is that there are no certainties in matters of this
kind.
T. F. X. apart, I am inclined to think--and I reason now from
history rather than specifics--that at some future date it will be seen
in retrospect that Mr . McNamara made many correct decisions as Secretary
of Defense and occasionally that he made wrong decisions .

But for the

present , all that can be asked, all that should be asked, of any man in
his position is that, under the President , he exer cise every diligence and
fUll dedication to his public responsibility and do his best to reach the
best decisions .
On that score , Mr. McNamara needs no defense from me or anyone
else .

His record speaks for itself.

His is , in these times , the most

difficult and the most complex assignment in the government after the
President .

His immense international responsibilities which dovetail with

those of the Secretary of State involve questions of life or death for tens
of millions in this country and elsewhere .

- 4In addition, he has the supreme administrative responsibilities
for the Defense Establishment .

That Department now contains a million

civilian employes and more than two and a half million men and women in
uniform .
Reposed in him is the trust of dispensing public funds in excess
of $50 billion a year, a sum equal to more than the total of all other
federal expenditures combined.
In the light of these vast responsibilities, Secretary McNamara
has been an outstanding and exceptional servant of the people of this
nation.

He was a tower of strength to the late President in

great burdens of Chief Executive.

car~ring

the

His remaining in office at the request

of President Johnson is an assurance to the nation that we will continue
to have the highest possible degree of intelligent, experienced and dedicated
public service in this most critical Cabinet position.
t1r . McNamara was confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of Defense
to see to it that this nation has the kind of defense structure which the
President, together with the Congress, deem necessary for national security.
He was confirmed by the Senate to bring about and maintain that structure
at the lov7est possible cost to the people of the United States .

That-- no

rr.ore , no less--is what the la\-T, the Constitutional po\vers of the Presidency,
and the dimensions of the office of Secretary of Defense require of him.
And I should think that every t·iember of this body would want to consider a
long time , a very long time , before seeking to require anything else of this
Secretary of Defense or any other.

I should think, too, that we would want

to consider a long time, a very long time , before curbing or undermining
the authority of the office of the Secretary of Defense in vie'l-7 of the
critical decisions which must be made if this responsibility is to be
effectively exercised.

- 5 If the Secretary of Defense does not have the authority to make
the critical decisions where else shall it be lodged tn this government?
What shell we require of the Secretary if it is not the critical decisions?
That he serve as a kind of coach or water- boy or, perhaps , a chaplain for
the military services?

That the final decisions, not merely those of t he

bRttlefield but of defense management and technology in effect , shall be
made by military personnel?

If I may be blunt , Mr . President , it woul d

appear, in that concept, that the Secretary ' s principal fun ctions ,.,ould be
reduced to fighting for the Defense Establishment ' s share of the tot al
national budgetary pie and then to keeping the various services from coming
to blows over how it is to be divided .

If

I may be blunt, in prior years

we have had our experience with that kind of an approach .
Indeed, the Secretary of Defense is a sort of umpire .

But the

fact is that the present Secretary of Defense is an umpire who has sought
increasingly to establish service- needs and expenditures on the basis of
the requirements of total national policies and in response to the admoni tions of the Congr ss for economic and efficient operation of the Defense
Establishment .

He is an umpire who has exercised the authority of his

office to say, not only "yes , " but "no, " when necessary , and to make the
"no" stick.

He has exercised the power to soy "no, " increasingly, to curb

that notorious invitation to waste and extravagence , the cost-plus contract .
He has exercised the power to say "no" to budgetary requests from the various
services which often and understandably are

heavily influenced by a one-

service rather than an all- service concept of national defense .

He has

exercised the power to say "no" to separate service purchase of cOOl!llon use
items of equipment and supply .

And the Congress knows that this type of

purchasing did much to bring about the stockpiling of military surpluses ,

- 6surpluses whose costs dwarf even those engendered in agriculture.

He has

exercised the power to say "no" to certain new weapons developments.

However,

any such development may intrigue its advocates, from the national point of
view it ought not to be pursued unless it contains sufficient promise end
can otherwise justify itself on the basis of cost-to-potential contribution
to total defense .

And lest there be any doubt of the need of such curbs,

I shall read to the Senate a list of projects and their cost to the public- projects which over the past ten years did indeed intrigue their advocates
but which were abandoned before completion or declared obsolete or surplus
soon after completion.

- 7 The

tot~l

is over $5 billion .

cost of these abandoned projects in the past ten years
To be sure , some value , some experience, may well have

been obtained from each of them.

But let there be no mistake about it .

Taken together they are indicative, to say the least, of an immense and
conspicuous consumption of the nation's supply of talent and facilities for
research and development .

For this technological high- living, it is the

people of the United States >-Tho must :pick up the check in actual military
costs and in the incalculable

costs of a. distorted usage of scarce

scientific and technological resources .
Taken together these abandoned projects have represented, too, a.
major factor in running up the accumulation of surplus and obsolescent
property by the armed services .

For years in the past the total of such

property disposed of at a fraction of cost has fluctuated between $1~ billion
and $8 billion annually.

To put this figure. in some kind of perspective,

consider that it means that every year our military establishment got rid
of, a.t a. fraction of cost, assets with a value

~There

from about equivalent

to, to double the amount that the United Kingdom expends on all its armed
services for all purposes .

In short , the British have been running their

Army , Navy and Air Forces year in and year out fo r something less than the
cost to us of our annual losses through excess military accumulations or
obsolescence .
t-1r . President, the Secretary of Defense, has, indeed, said "no"
with frequency during the three years in which he has been in office .

Yet

there is nothing to suggest that because he has done so our defense position
in the world is any less effective, any less impressive than heretofore .
On the contrary, such indications a.s there are suggest that the Defense
Establishment is better prepared and more capable of meeting a \7ider
range of possible military challenges to this nati on .

- 8 There is a good deal of talk about the high cost of government
and the need to cut expenditures .

In the light of this talk, I cannot

imagine that anyone in the Senate would wish to undermine the Secretary's
authority to say "no" to the ever-present and immense bureaucratic pressures
for expenditures within the Defense Establishment .
away at almost any item in the budget.

To be sure we can chop

The Department of State, for

example, had a budget request for $374 million this year and a show of
economy can be made by reducing it and closing a few consulates abroad in
the process.

But vre are deluding oursel vcs if we believe for one moment

that it will be possible to curb the grovnh in the cost of the federal
government , let alone reduce that cost significantly unless someone has
the authority , under the President , to act decisively in connection with
defense expenditures .

For that is where the great expenditures are .

In

the 1964 budget , for exampl e , $53 .7 billion was proposed by the President
for the Defense Establishment .

The next allocation in oize in that budget

was $11 . 3 billion for Treasury, and of this total $10.2 billion represents
an allocation for interest on the public debt .
I ask the Senate to note , further, that the figure of $53.7
billion in new obligational authority for the Defense Department represented
the final figure proposed in the budget submitted to
year.

Con~ress

early this

But before it was arrived at, Secretary McNamara had pared down

requests from all of the individual military services under his supervision.
When these individual requests initially reached his desk they totaled the
great sum of $67 billion .

In other vrords , Mr . President , the services,

left to their own individual devices, would have sought of the Congress

$13 . 3 billion more than the Secretary of Defense, in the end, allm-red them
to ask.

And yet in spite of this enormous cut, the $53 .7 billion requested

for the armed services for fiscal :year 1964 'ras still a record

hi~h .

- 9ilith all due respect, would the President have been in a position
to direct, except arbitrarily, a cut of $13 . 3 billion in the combined requests of the various services?

With all due respect, would this body or

even its exceptionally capable Armed Services Committee have been able to
say "no", with any degree of confidence, to the tune of a reduction of

$13. 3 billion? vTould the equivalent body in the House? With all due
respect, I think the Congress would have had great difficulty in knowing
where to enter the jungle of Defense finance and I doubt that we would have
gone much beyond the fringes for fear of jeopardizing the necessary defense
of the nation.
And, so, Mr . President, we are back to a Secretary of Defense
with authority.

If we did not have one he \TOuld have to be invented .

I am persuaded that we have in office an exceptional Secretary
of Defense who is attempting to meet the ful.l responsibilities of that
office .

I believe t hat he is exercising with great determination, intel-

ligence and knowledge the authority which must go with those responsibilities .
It would seem to me that we ought to do whatever we are able to
do t o help him in his responsibilities .

For we are all in agreement that

we are seriously challenged by Communist power from abroad in a military
sense as well as in other ways .

We are all in agreement that against the

military challenge there must be posed the necessary military defense for
the security of the nation, at whatever the cost.
But the extent of the challenge from abroad is a variable depending upon changes in the world situation.

The phrase "necessary military

defense" is e variable, subj ect in interpretation to infinite extension.
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And the phrase "at whatever the cost" is a blank cheque which if taken in
a literal sense, can be drawn, in the end, upon the total resources of the
people of the United States .
These are realities, Mr. President, wbi ch are just beginning to
dawn UPOn us .

These are realities with which, I believe, the present

Secretary of Defense is seeking to grapple. These are realities to which,
as legislators, we must turn our attention.

It seems to me that we must

begin to think deeply as to how the dimensions of "necessary military defense" may be drawn and redrawn more accurately in the light of an everchanging international situation.

And we must ask ourselves, too, how

are we to keep "whatever the cost" of that necessary defense at a rational
level in order that, in the end, it does not overwhelm the nation.
These are not empty questions nor are they theoretical questions.
"Necessary defense" has been defined and redefined consistently over the
past decade as more and more .

''ofhatever the cost" has risen from $37.8

billion in fiscal 1954 to the $53 ·7 billion which was requested for fiscal

1964. And the latter figure, as already noted, '1-Tas presented to the Congress after the Secretary of Defense had reduced

~·\:; the

initial service

requests of $67 billion by $13·3 billion.
May

I say that it is understandable if, in defining the dimen-

sions of necessary military defense, those who have direct military responsibility are inclined to leave a margin for safety.

That is appropriate;

it is proper; it is to be commended rather than criticized.

After all,

those who have these responsibilities are grappling in an area which is
both inexact and ever-changing and one which is not subject, in the end,
to computer-calculation.
I , for one, do not begrudge the cost of a margin for extra
safety--a substantial margin--and I believe the people of the nation

- ll are similarly inclined. But the problem still remains. We must be evermindful lest in determining what is necessary for military defense we become so obsessed with the extra margin for safety that it grows into a
fear-fed monster which, in the end, devours that which it is designed to
safeguard.
In the same fashion, our willingness to pay "whatever the cost"
of necessary defense must not be an invitation to acquiesce in administrative procedures within the defense establishment which tend toward wasteful rather than prudent expenditures .

And I would emphasize that in this

area- -in the area of management procedures--there is no excuse for an excessive margin of safety.

Expenditures for the management of the defense

establishment, unlike the determination of over- all defense needs, can be
subject to reasonably exact control by computer-calculation, by accounting
procedures and by the many other tools of modern American business management.
If I may sum up,

~rr .

President, two questions ought to be ever-

present in our minds in considering any problem of defense :
1.

How are ·He to insure that this government defines and re-

defines "necessary military defense" with full adequacy but without fantastic and obsessive excess, in a world situation in which "necessary
defense" is an ever- changing but not necessarily an ever- increasing
quantity?
2.

How are we to design the procedures within this government

and within the Defense establishment so that they will provide this fully
adequate necessary defense at the least cost to the people of the nation
who, in the end, must pay for it?

- 12 -

There is no formula by which these questions may be answered.
For years, we have been ordering and re-ordering the proces r;es of the
Executive Branch, in order that that branch may define more accurately
for the President the nature of the international dangers which confront
us .

For years we have been orderj.ng and re-ordering the struct-ure of the

Defense Department, in an effort to limit expenditures to the necessary.
Yet year after year the problem has loomed
If

~ere

lar ger~

is not an easy formula, there are certain negatives

which might be examined. for the light that they shed on what may stimulate
defense costs far beyond the necessary.
me, we must

~

These are the things, it seems to

do, if we mean to keep a rational perspective on the

realities which face us in the world and, in the li&ht of them1 hold expenditures for defense at a rational level consistent with national sec1.1rity.
These negatives, these tentative observations, I should like to leave with
the Senate in concluding my remarks.
In defining and redefining the dimensions of "what is necessary"
for defense, we are likely to leave a most wasteful, rether than a desirable margin for safety unless these realities are reco82ized anew:
1. Tha:t, under our system of government, there can be no
substitute for the preponderant judgments of the President as to t he total
and the ever-changing challenge from abroad to this nationo

These judg-

ments must provide the key for determining the essential dimensions of
what is militarily necessSEY for the security of the nation.
2. That, in making his j udgments, the President must necessarily depend on advice and counsel from whatever sources he deems appropriate--military and civilian--but once his judgments are made, it is inappropriate for

any

permanent official of the Executive Branch--military

or civilian--to do other than his best to carry them into effect.

- 13 -

3· That the President's judgments--once made--in this
connection are subject to challenge not by permanent officials of the
Executive Branch--military or civilj.an- -but only by the
as the Constitution makes clear that it can and shall

Co~eress,

ac~y

acting

legislative

initiative and by legislative oversight.

4. That, under the President an.d the laws of the land, the
Secretary of Defense has the authority to establish--with the help of the
Joint Chiefs- -the strategic concepts which shall set for all the armed
services, their appropriate roles in maint aining the kind of defense which
the President and the Congress have deemed necessary for the nationts
security; and, further, that within the Defense Establishment, the Secretary
of Defense has authority to control administrative procedures and practices
for efficient and effective operations.
And if I may continue with the negatives, Mr. President, I should
like also to stress that we are not going to get an effective and efficient
defense at a tolerable cost unless it j_s recognized in all f r ankness:
lo

That the Defense Establishment, as the largest single

purchaser of goods and services in the nation, has come to occupy a substantial

posi~ion

in the civilian economy of this nation; that, in this connec-

tion1 what the Defense Department does or does not do has come to have great
isPortance not only for defense but for the well-being of business, labor
and whole communities scattered thrOUghOUt the nationo
2.

That, in the light of this economic position which the

Defense Establishment occupies it would be a gross naivete to assume that
pressures--increasing pressures--will not be present for decisions to be
made by the Defense Department not solely on considerations of necessary,
effective and efficient defense--and may I say that colloquies on the floor
between Senators from various of the larger states underscore this point.

- 14 3. That however understandable these pressures mey be--and
as a Senator from Montana I hope that I try to do as much for

my

state ns

any other Member--the nation will be ill- served if there is not within this
government those attitudes and those conditions for administration of t he
affairs of the Defense Establishment which permit the decisions, in t he
end, to be made on the basis of necessary, effective and efficient defense.
Mr. President, in making these remarks today, I have not been
unaware of the eloquent farewell address of the former President, Mr.
Eisenhower, in which he warned of the need to guard against the development
of an industrial-military complex of power in the nation.

Nor have I been

unmindful of dangers to that classic doctrine of freedom--the doctrine of
civilian supremacy.
And yet, with all due respect, I do not see the principal diffi=
culty which confronts us in these contexts.

If there were ever to be an

imminent danger to freedom in this nation of the kind alluded t o by Mr.
Eisenhower, it is not likely to be the cause of the failure of popularly
responsible government.

Rather it is likely to be the consequence of the

failure of civilian responsibility in the Congress no less than in the
Executive Branch of the government.

And I want to say to the Senate, that

this system of freedom which we know will not fail.

It will not fail so

long as an excessive fear does not drive us to an obsessive interpretation
of what is necessary for defense.

It will not fail if we are prepared to

face the economic and social difficulties which confront the nation and
deal with them on their own merits--their civilian merits- - rather than to
seek to evade them, or to act on them haphazardly and inadequately and
ineffectively because we find it easier to act under the camouflage of an
inflated concept of military necessity.

- 15 These, then, Mr . President , are some of the observations which
I have to make .

They are observations stimulated by the work of the

T. F. X. inquiry which is being conducted by the very able Senator from
Arkansas (Mr . McClellen) end his distinguished colleagues on the Government
Operations Committee .

They are observations growing out of a very high

respect for the patriotic dedication and the ability with which

~rr .

McNamara

is seeking to serve the nation under the President .
It is incumbent upon all of us , it seems to me, not to ignore
these larger implications of the T. F. X. matter .

It is incumbent upon us--

the President, the Congress , the press and the people of the United States-to face them, to discuss them, and , as necesaary , to act on them within the
Constitution.

Department of the Army
Projects Cancelled

(1953 - 1963)

Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of DoLlars)

Prime
Contractor.; \:;)

MISS1IES
DART

1958

44.0

Aerophysics Corp.

A wire-guided surface-to-surface antitank missile with a range
of approximately 6, 000 yards. This missile system was ca.cceJ~ed
since the French designed SS-lO proved to be more effective in this
role .
ORDNANCE, COMBAT VEHIClES AND RELATED EQUllMENT

VIGILANTE

32.0

Sperry Gyroscope

A 6-barrel, 37mm automatic anti-~ircraft gun system mounted on a
full-track vehicle chassis and complete with radar fire control.
This gun system was cancelled since the MAUlER surface-to- air
missile system has been designed and should be more effective in
the anti-aircraft role intended.
OTHER EQUIPMENT

AN/USD 4 Drone

l960

Republic Aviation

A medium endurance survelliance drone, capable of carrying a
450 lb. pay-load for 55 minutes duration. This drone program
was cancelled since it was considered that the AN/USD-5, when
developed, could perform this mission as well.
AN /USD 5 Drone

l962

F a:l.rchild Astro
Corporation

A long-endurance surve'il.lance drone, capable of carrying a 450 lb.
pay- load for 90 minutes duration. This drone program was cancelled
since cost effectiveness studies have indicated that the Air Force
with their F4c and RF-lOl modernization program can perform the
mission more effectively.

Department of the Army
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Pro.:ject Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
of Dollars)

(~1illions

Prime

~actor~

(s)

MISSUES
DART

1958

44.0

Aerophysics Corpo

A wire-guided surface- to - surface antitank missile with a range
of approximately 6,000 yards . This missile system was cancelled
since the French designed SS- 10 proved to be more effective in this
role .
ORDNANCE, COMBAT VEHIClES AND BElATED EQtJIIMENT
VIGILANTE

32 .0

Sperry Gyroscope

A 6-barrel, 37mm automatic anti- aircraft gun system mounted on a
full- t r ack vehicle chassis and complete with radar f~·e control.
This gun system was cancelled since the ~AUIER surface- to- air
missile system has been designed and should be more effective in
the anti-aircraft role intended.
OTEER EQUIFMENT
AN/USD 4 Drone

196o

4o.o

Republic Aviation

A medium endurance survelliance drone, capable of carrying a
450 lb. pay-load for 55 minut,es duration. This clxone program
was cancelled since it was considered that the AN/USD - 5, when
developed, could per form this mission as well .
AN/USD 5 Drone

Fairchild Astro
Corporation

A long- endurance surve·iJ.lance drone, capable of carrying a 450 lb.
pay- load for 90 minutes duration. This drone program was cancelled
since cost effectiveness studies have indicated that the Air Force
with their F4c and RF -101 modernization program can perform the
mission more effectively.

Department of the Navy
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title

Funds Invested
Year Cancelled (Millions of Dollars)

Prime
Contractor( e )

AIRCRAFT:
SEAMASTER

1959

330.4

Martin Co.
Morlan Canst., Coo

Jet powered mine laying seaplaneo Specialized for low
altitude attack against submarine pens., Cancelled because of
technical problems, high cost and slippage in programo
MISSilES:
REGULUS

II

1958

144.4

Ling Tempco
L.F. Stillwell
& Co .

Surface- to- surface missile with 500 nautical mile range
and weight of ll,570 lb. equipped with Shoran grid guidance .
Cancelled because it became redundant '\-Then better systems were
assured before its completion.
PETREL

Fairchild A/C

1957

Air- to-surface missile ~th 20 nautical mile range and
'\-reight of 3300 lbs. equipped with active radar homing plus
acoustic torpedo. Cancelled for consideration of rea6ons
including state- of- the- art advances, changing military reQ.uirements and cost considerations .
CORVUS

1960

8o.o

Ling Tempco

Air-·bo- surface missile with 170 nautical mile r ange and
weight of 1'750 lbs. equipped with passive or semi-active radar
homing. Cancelled for consideration of reasons including state of- the- art advances, changing military requirements, cost consider ations, plus contractor difficulties .

EAGIE

Bendix Aviation

Air- to- air missile with 70 nautical mile range and weight
of 14o0 lbs. equipped with midcourse command plus active radar
homing~
Since this was the missile system for the Missileer
aircraft, it was cancelled when Missileer ,.,as dropped.

Department of the Navy
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Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invest ed
(Millions of Dollars)

Prime
Contractor(s)

MISSilES:
METEOR

M. I . T .

Air- to-air missile with 10 nautical mile range and weight
of 510 lbs . and semi-active homing. Cancelled in weeding out
of early air-to- air missi.l e projects in favor of more promising
air- to- air projects .
RIGEL

Grumman A/C

1953

Surface-to-surface missile with 4oo nautical mile range
and weight of 19,000 lbs . equipped with ramjet, command midcourse, plus radar homing. Cancelled for same weeding out
process as METEOR above , plus it was a competitor to REGULUSo
DOVE

1955

33·7

Eastman Kodak
Co.

Air-to-s~~face missile with gravity bomb and weight of 1300 lbs .
equipped with infrared homing. Cancelled because of changing re quirements plus technical difficulties.

SHIPS:

Submarine Underwater
Propulsion Systems

1954

General Electric
Allis-Chalmers
Elliott Company
Westinghouse
Elec .

Wor k began in 1945 and continued to 1954 on closed and semiclosed propulsion cycles, all of which could be used to propel
submarines in fully submerged conditions. Cancelled because of
the success of nuclear propulsion.
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<YIHER:

NRRS, Sugar Grove

1962

70o0

Tidewater Constr, Co.
Patterson-Emerson
Constr.

A 6oo'diameter, rotatable radio antennae device to
provide an improved capability in space research and intelligence gathering activities. Cancelled because costs
increased from initial estimate of less than $80 million
to over $190 million and) during the period •rhen the structural design phase of the antennae was in progress, other
scientific techniques capable of performing the antennae
functions were perfected.
ZIP Fuel

1959

Callery Chem. Co.

Fuel of 5~ higher energy than jet fuel, for use in
gas turbines. Cancelled because of high cost and technical
difficulties.

Department of the Air Force
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

Prime
Contro.ctor(s)

AIRCRAFT :

5llo6·H

ANP

Boeing/Gen. Dyna~

GE/P&W
This was a program to develop a n~clear -powered long-r ange,
long endurance aircraft for possible strategic applicationo The
program was cancelled because it had inadequate military potential
in any form which was technically feasible.
F- lo8

North American

1959

This program was for development of a long-range (1000 mile)
supersonic manned interceptor, equipped with a highly sophisticated
fire control system, to counter the airborne bomber threat of the
1960's and 1970's . The overall program was cancelled because of
the relative decrease of the manned bomber threat.
XF-103

1957

10~ . 0

Republic

This was an advanced fighte::- concept for a titanium mach
3.0 fighter, powered by a dual cycle (turbojet/ramjet) propulsion
system. It li'as cancelled primarily as a result of technical
problems (e . g. poor visibility, J-67 engine problems) rising costs,
and greater promise of the F -108 program (e . g. long range) •
F-107

North

1957

Am~ican

This was a fighter-bomber development program in competition
with the F-105. It was cancelled in favor of the latter, which
proved to be a superior weapon system.
J -83 Engines

1959

55o0

Fairchild

This was a small lightweight turbojet engine in the 2000 lbo
thrust range, for possible missile or aircraft applicationo It
was cancelled in favor of a competitively superior engine .

*

**

Tentative; pending termination proceedings.
AF costs only.
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AIRCRAFT:
C-132

1957

Douglas

This was a turboprop heavy long-range transport designed to
carry 100,000 lb. payload. It was cancelled because of potential
high cost and because the C - 133~ although not capable of as high
a payload, appeared sufficiently versatile to meet Air Force needs.
T-61 Engine

Allison

1959

This was an internal combustion burboprop engine of advanced
design.. Cancellation was based on the fact that the engine bad not
been designated for application to any specific future weapon system.
H-16

1954

Vertol

This was an extremely large fuselage, twin-rotor~ high capacity
helicopter. Hampered by technical problems, delays and cost overrun, it 'IoTas cancelled as a result of reappraisal following the crash
of an experimental model.
MISSILES:

NAVAHO

North American

1957

This was a supersonic surface-to-surface intercontinental
strategic missile . It was cancelled in its flight test phase,
having been overtaken by the accelerated ICBM development program.
SNARK

677·4

Norttu:-op

This was a subsonic surface- to-surface intercontinental
strategic missileo Although completely developed and placed in
the active inventory, it was rendered quickly obsolete by the
accelerated ICBM program.

GAM-63 RASCAL

1958

448. 0

Bell

This was an air-launched air- to- surface missile for use by
strategic forces (B- 47) • The program was cancelled in favor of
the inherently superior Hound Dog~

Department of the Air Force
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MISSilES:

44o ..o*

GAM-87 Skybolt

Douglas

This was a ballistic missile to be air launched from the B- 52
or British Vulcan bombers . Cost escalation, time delay, revised
estimates of actual performanace, and avallability of other ways to
do the job better on a cost- effectiveness basis caused cancellation.
TAIDS (Land Based)

1957

ll8.1

Bendix

This was a land-based surface-to- air missile for the air defense
mission. Air Force effort ter minated ,.,hen short range surface- to- air
missiles were designated as an Army sole responsibi.l ity.
Mobile MINUTEMAN

108 . 4

Boeing

This program consisted of the present Minuteman surface- tosurface missile transported and fired from railroad cars. It was
cancelled because of high cost and little military value versus
other systems .
Q-4 DRONE

1959

84. 4

Northrop

This was a small t~bojet drone to be used by Air Defense
Command for training. It was cancelled because of a lack of
funds and a change in requirements .
SM-73 GOOSE

1958

Fairchild

This was a subsonic long range decoy missile for strategic
application, to be ground launched as an electronic countermeasure
device . The pr ogram was overtaken by other developments (e . g. GAM- 72
Quail) and by changes in concept of operation .
GAM-67 CROSSB0\-1

1956

Northrop

This program was the original air-to-surface anti-radiation
missile (ARM). The modern version is the SHRIKE. It was cancelled
because other systems were considered more favorable and because of
uncertainties in the guidance system.
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OTHER:

AN/AI.R-27

1959

142.0

Sperry

This program was a complete integrated electronic countermeasures system for the B-52. It was cancelled because of the
extreme cost.
Hi Energy Boron
Fuel

1959

l35o8**

Olin Mathieson,
others

The program was for the development of fuel to power a
Chemically Powered Bomber. It was cancelled because it was
overtaken by other developments, because of technical problems
encountered, and because the requirement was cancelled for the
specific aircraft to which it had known application.

